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States have international obligations to ensure that all 
deprivations of an individual’s liberty are consistent 
with international human rights law. The majority 
of provisions in the international human rights law 
instruments that deal with such deprivations of 
liberty contain the term ‘arbitrary’, yet there is no 
clear definition of what this entails. Arbitrariness 
is defined differently by different supervisory 
bodies in different cases, and in different contexts; 
understanding it requires 
awareness of the different 
factors affecting how individual 
deprivations of liberty are 
examined and understood. 
An important factor is the 
dominance of discourses 
around national security 
and notions of territorial 
sovereignty. The right of states 
to control entry into their 
territories has consistently 
been made explicit by the 
European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), emphasising 
that as long as the detention 
is considered to serve a 
legitimate public interest 
it cannot be considered as 
arbitrary. The apparent counter-
balances to this are the concepts of proportionality 
and necessity, and the UN Human Rights Committee 
suggests that these two concepts remain central in 
situations of deprivation of liberty. It is not enough 
that a detention serves a political purpose; if it fails 
the tests of proportionality and necessity it cannot 
be justifiable and is therefore ‘arbitrary’. Indeed, 
some argue that in cases concerning asylum seekers 
there is no legal justification for detention unless 
in exceptional circumstances such as a threat to 
national security or public order. Nevertheless, 
states continue to detain migrants without regard 
to proportionality and necessity. Closely linked 
to the ideas of proportionality and necessity, the 
notions of fairness, justice and predictability are 
also central to understanding arbitrariness, and 
must be kept in mind in any examination of whether 
a particular detention is or is not arbitrary.
In the context of deportation proceedings, according 
to the ECtHR, detention can only be justified for as 
long as proceedings are in progress, and “if such 
proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence, the 
detention will cease to be permissible”.1 Irrespective 
of state claims to the contrary, detention of those 
awaiting deportation must be both proportionate 
and necessary; that the detainee in question is 
subject to removal is not sufficient justification. 
Finally there must always be consideration of the 
individual circumstances of any particular case. It is 
crucial that a ‘one size fits all’ approach be avoided. It 
should not be enough that a state is acting in pursuit 
of a broader policy of immigration control or that 
generalised notions of national security are being 
invoked; the proportionality and necessity of each and 
every instance of detention should be scrutinised. 
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Family locked in holding cell, Tucson, Arizona, in the US.
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